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Abstract
In this article, we consider the test of synchronous data flow software (written in SCADE) embedded in aircraft
computers. The validation of such software is a complex process, which requires some tests in real conditions (e.g.
flying conditions). During these tests, some variables of the software are recorded at a chosen frequency. The
recorded data represent a partial observation of the state of the computer during the flight. When an unwanted
behaviour of the aircraft is detected during the test, we need to identify the cause of this behaviour from the
recorded data in order to choose the best way to correct the software.
The cause of the observed behaviour can be determined by computing some scenarios consistent with the partial
observation according to the specification of the system. The number of plausible scenario might be high and we
have to identify a finite subset of the most relevant scenarios. Indeed, each computed scenario involves particular
computation paths in the SCADE software. It is worth noting that a computation path can be activated by a class of
scenarios. So we propose to compute a scenario per path to identify the part of the software which should be
corrected. 
For these purposes, we have used GATEL tool. We show how to use this tool on an example taken from software of
an A320 computer for which the engineers observed the detection of non meaningful alarms, and we compare the
result obtained with each tool. For such experiment, the main difficulty is due to a problem of combinatorial
explosion, and we show how these tools can take into account the engineer knowledge about the system in order to
reduce the number of possible scenarios.
1. Introduction
The debugging of real time embedded software consists in finding out the cause of an unexpected behaviour from a
generally partial observation of the calculator state. More precisely, we need to identify the input data value, which
leads to erroneous value of the output data, or of any observed data (e.g. internal data of the software observed by a
development tool). In a way, the activity of debugging can be seen as the dual of testing which consist in fixing the
value of input data, and to check the corresponding output value against the specification.
In this paper, we suggest a technique to assist the debugging of embedded software like those used in avionics or
car industries. Such software is generally written in a language, which mixes calculations, state-transition systems,
boolean functions and temporal operators to generate some commands for some actuators. These commands are
usually subjected to time constraints, the size of the software can be big (in term of number of software
components, or lines of code), and the calculator is, most of the time, interacting with a complex environment.
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In such a situation, the debugging can be fastidious and costly. The technique we describe here aims at highlighting
the pieces of code by which an error is susceptible of having been propagated. Our approach concerns data flow
software specifications like SCADE [Esterel2003] or SIMULINK. In these formalisms, the software is described as
a net of operators. The nodes of the net correspond to operators (boolean gates, arithmetical operations, temporal
gates, comparison operators), and the arcs represent software variables.
In this context, a piece of code propagating an error is a path from an input to an output of the net, such that:
- We observe an error (unexpected value) on the output arc of the path.
- All operators along the path propagate on its output, the error present on its arc input, which belongs to the
path.
We use so, the concept of path predicate and arc predicate given in [PAR96], and the Gatel test case generator
[MAR00] to compute the input/output values corresponding to each error propagation paths of the net.
Remark. Our technique does not concern the code verification. The code is supposed to meet its specification
because it has been checked by structural tests for instance or, as in our case, because it is automatically generated
from the SCADE specification. The problem we are tracking here corresponds to some mistakes in the model of the
environment which lead to behaviour cases which are not taken into account by the specification. The computation
of the error propagation path allows the identification of the inputs which cause these behaviour cases and gives
some information to the software designers so they can choose an appropriate solution to correct the problem.
2. Data flow specification of  real time software
The computation of a SCADE or SIMULINK operator net is performed periodically i.e. the runs of the operators
are synchronised on the clock of the net. The arguments of the operators are data flows i.e. infinite sequences of
values taken at each clock cycle. For example:
- The variable x is the sequence : x(t0), x(t1), ..., x(ti), ... where x(ti ) denote  the value of x at the i-th clock cycle.
- The constant 1 is the sequence: 1, 1, ..., 1, ...
- Operators are applied on the flows point to point : x ⊕ y is the sequence : x(t0) ⊕ y(t0), ..., x(ti) ⊕ y(ti), ...
where ⊕ stand for an operator: ∧ (logic and), ∨ (logic or), ¬ (not), + (addition), ...
- Temporal operators are defined as follow :
- Confirmation delay CONF(e, d): s(t) ↔ ( e(t-d) ∧ e(t-d+1) ∧ ... ∧ e(t))
Where e and s are respectively the input and the output of the operator, and d is the confirmation duration.
- Set/reset SRQ(s, r): q(t) ↔ (set(t) ∨ q(t-1)) ∧ ¬ reset(t)
Where q(t) is the value of the output of the set/reset operator at t
The interested reader may find more details in papers related to Lustre, the textual language that underlay the
SCADE notation [HAL87].
The example given in the figure below is a simplification of a part of Airbus A320 software dedicated to the
monitoring of accelerometer sensors. x is an input values provided by a sensor. When the input x is greater than a
threshold for more than 8 clock cycles (confirmation delay CONFi), an error is detected and stored by using the
set/reset operators (node SRQ). The output flow z6 represents a ‘confirmed error sensor’ signal.
For safety reason, this computation is duplicated on several lanes. When an error has been confirmed on a lane, the
software sends a reset on the corresponding set/reset operator, and then it switches to a backup mode, which
computes the acceleration value from a different set of sensors (not represented). Inputs p1, p2, p3 and p4 are used
to take into account the current functioning mode of the lane.
On this example, the values of the sensors were noisier than expected during particular behaviour cases (take off).
This was leading to the detection of non-meaningful errors.
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In the following sections, we show how we can find out a finite set of scenarios, which raise an alarm, i.e. put the
value z6 to true. In order to get a representative subset of scenario, we propose to cover all computation paths
which lead to z6=true. We first introduce the formal definition of such paths, and then we present how to generate
scenarios covering the paths with Gatel. Finally, we give the results obtained for our example.
3. Error propagation path
An error is detected when some output has not the expected value within a given input context. In order to help
debug, we want to find out on which inputs depend the faulty outputs and for these inputs of interest, what are the
class of values that can cause the error. 
In [PAR96], the authors introduced the concept of “arc predicate” in order to characterise dependency between an
input and an output of one operator, whatever is the input value. Let op be an operator, ei one of op input and sj one
of op output. Then, an arc predicate AP(ei, sj, op(e1, … en)) is the condition, which ensures that sj value depends
on ei value. Let us examine an AND operator and a temporal operator SRQ.
AND operator. 
We note s=AND(e1,e2). The first operand e1 is evaluated in any case. So activation condition is true. We note this
as follows:
AP(e1, s,)=true. 
The second value e2 is propagated to s if e1 is not equal to false (else, s value is false, independently from e2
value). So 
AP(e2, s)=not(e1).
SRQ operator.
We note q=SQR(s,r). Reset r has the priority. So
AP(r, q)=true.
Set condition s will impact q if r is false. So
AP(s, q)=not(r).
During a computation, a path (e1, e2, … en) is active if all the predicates AP(ei, ei+1) are true. We want to exhibit
the paths related to a given test objective by generating inputs that trigger these paths. So, we propose to use the arc
predicate definitions as coverage criteria and ask a test case generator to cover a maximum of arc predicates.
In [DUB03], the authors propose to extend the arc predicate coverage in order to take into account also the classes
of values that go through operators. The new predicates can be illustrated in the following way.
AND operator. 
s=AND(e1,e2). The predicates AP(e1, s,)=true and AP(e2, s)=not(e1) are complemented to identify the classes of
propagated values (true or false in this case). We note this “arc-value-predicate” AVP. We got the following new
criteria for the AND operator:
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1. AVP(e1=true , s)=true and e1 = e1 
2. AVP(e1=false, s)=true and not(e1) = not(e1)  
3. AVP(e2=true , s)=not(e1) and e2
4. AVP(e2=false, s)=not(e1)and not(e2)
The case 2 is covered by cases 3 and 4. So, the retained criteria are:
AVP(e1=true , s)= e1 
AVP(e2=true , s)=not(e1) and e2  
AVP(e2=false, s)=not(e1)and not(e2).
Similarly, we retained the criteria below for the SRQ operator.
AVP(r=true , q)=r
AVP(s=true , q)=not(r) and s
AVP(s=false, q)=not(r)and not(s).
4. Generation of scenario with Gatel
We need a scenario generator to compute the inputs that allows the coverage of AVP predicates with respect to a
given test objective (error observed). We propose to use the Gatel tool [MAR00]. Gatel generates test sequences by
solving a set of constraints derived from a Lustre specification and a test objective. Test objectives describe an
execution context we want to reach by tests. These objectives are stated by Lustre boolean expressions. They might
be simple expression like “z6=true”. Such a formula characterizes memory states. They might also refer any
temporal operator or any function written in Lustre in order to specify the partial runs we are interested in.
Gatel has two main functioning modes. In the fully automatic mode, it tries to generate one sequence of input
values that leads to the situation described by the test objective. In the interactive mode, users guide the resolution
in order to explore several scenarios. Moreover, users can stop the resolution in the interactive mode in order to
point out classes of values that should satisfy the constraints. The interactive mode seems appropriated in our case
but a difficulty is to avoid too much interactivity. 
Lustre specifications are structured into hierarchy of nodes. So, in our example, the whole schema is a node
consisting of six instances of more generic nodes. The five generic nodes are AND, OR, <, CONF, SRQ, which
encode in Lustre the operators depicted previously. We want to interact at the level of the generic nodes and not go
into the details of their Lustre encoding. We use the “split with” directive to work at this level. This directive can
be associated to a node output. It imposes sub-cases that shall be considered when the tool searches possible values
of the tagged outputs. In our example, we associated to the output of each generic node the AVP conditions
presented before.
During the interactive resolution, Gatel proposes to split a selection of outputs (a subset of {z6, z5, z4, z3, z2, z1}
in our example) at a clock cycle (the current cycle or older ones).  Users choose one output of the selection and
trigger a new resolution step by simply clicking on the chosen output. Thus a set of test cases is progressively built.
The process is iterated until all test cases are completely built or until the users decide to stop the exploration. We
used the following exploration strategies. Firsts, priority is given to the outputs computed at the current clock cycle.
Secondly, at a given cycle, priority is given to the most external outputs in order to progressively go back to the
inputs. Third, we stop the resolution of a branch when Gatel proposes to solve at an older clock cycle a set of
constraints that were already solved at a more recent clock cycle. This means indeed that we privileged the
coverage of path by the shortest scenario and do not want enter into useless loops. Finally, we also stop the
resolution when Gatel proposes only to go into the detail of a generic node. 
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By such cuts, we reduce dramatically the number of scenarios. We risk getting partially solved scenarios, which do
not lead to the test objective. Gatel offers the possibility to go back to the automatic mode in order to complete each
partial scenario. 
5. Example
In our example, we want to understand when an alarm is raised, i.e. we want to identify which paths are taken when
the output z6 is true. We got the following scenarios thanks to the strategy described previously.
%#CYCLE   p2   p3    p4    z6
%     ?  ...  ...   ...   ...
      0    _    _  true  true
This Gatel result states : “p4 is true and z6 is true at the current time cycle 0”. This result satisfies all the constraints
derived from the specification, whatever are the values of the other input variables. This is a skeleton of admissible
runs, which reach the test objective. Such skeletons are also called “models” of the specification and the test
objective. Gatel can be seen as a “model” generator. Finally, we notice that the path of interest goes from p4 to z6
directly.
%#CYCLE    p2     p3     p4    z6
%     ?   ...    ...    ...   ...
      0  true  false  false  true
In this case, the values of p2 and p3 impact z6 because p4 is false. It is worth noting that all cases are disjoint. The
coverage criteria impose indeed this separation.
%#CYCLE     x    p1     p2     p3     p4    z6
%     ?   ...   ...    ...    ...    ...   ...
      9     _     _      _      _      _     _
      8  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      7  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      6  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      5  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      4  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      3  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      2  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      1  3..?  true      _      _      _     _
      0  3..?  true  false  false  false  true
In this case, the values of x and p1 impact z6 because they have particular values during 8 computation cycle. The
notation 3..? means that x is an integer greater than 2. We stopped here the resolution before allocating an exact
value to x and this allows the identification of a class value of interest.
%#CYCLE    x   p1     p2     p3     p4    z6
%     ?  ...  ...    ...    ...    ...   ...
      1    _    _      _  false      _     _
      0    _    _  false  false  false  true
We stopped the resolution of this case because it explores new paths with respect to the time dimension. Indeed, it
tries to trigger a set condition (as in the two previous cases) but at the previous clock cycle.
6. Conclusion
We proposed methods and tools to assist the debugging of dataflow synchronous software. More specifically, our
proposal allows the exhibition of scenario classes, which lead to the observation of an erroneous behaviour. The
number of such scenarios may be very high. We identified coverage criteria of interest for the debugging in order to
reduce the scenario search: we aim at covering all computation paths within the net of dataflow operators and
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exhibiting important classes of values. We used the Gatel tool and propose strategies to achieve the scenario search
with respect to the coverage criteria. Finally, we illustrated our approach by a typical piece of code embedded in
avionics. The experiments are going on. The approach is more widely tested in ONERA and AIRBUS projects
(Vepre [Vepre04] and Testability [DUR03]).
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